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Abstract
Efforts to expand coastal State jurisdiction to include security jurisdiction in the EEZ were
soundly rejected by a majority of the nations that participated in the UNCLOS negotiations The
delegates present achieved consensus on provisions that accommodate the resource interests of
the coastal State in the EEZ without diminishing user State interests in freedom of navigation
and other internationally lawful uses of the sea in the zone. Continued efforts by some States to
reinterpret the Convention to unilaterally and unlawfully advance their national interests in the
EEZ impinge on traditional uses of the oceans by all States and are inconsistent with international law, long-standing state practice and the intent and negotiating history of UNCLOS. If these
efforts succeed, the Convention will unravel over time and the international community will once
again be plagued by a new wave of excessive maritime claims. Coastal State competency in the
EEZ is strictly limited to resource rights, jurisdiction over resource-related offshore installations
and structures, marine scientific research, and protection of the marine environment. Coastal
States do not retain security jurisdiction in the EEZ, and may not regulate lawful military activities in the EEZ that are consistent with the UN Charter, UNCLOS, the Chicago Convention,
and other relevant international law instruments. The creation of the EEZ was a package deal—
coastal States were granted exclusive resource rights and user States retained the high seas
freedoms of navigation and overflight, and other lawful uses of the seas associated with those
freedoms, which have always applied beyond the territorial sea.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On 11 December 1982, Ambassador Tommy T.B. Koh of Singapore, President of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III), asked the assembled delegates at the final session of the Conference a rhetorical question: whether the Conference had achieved its “fundamental objective of producing a comprehensive constitution for the oceans” that would
“stand the test of time.”1 Ambassador Koh answered his own question in the
“A Constitution for the Oceans”, Remarks by Tommy T.B. Koh, President of the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, adapted from statements
by the President on 6 and 11 December 1982 at the final session of the Conference
1
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affirmative, for a number of reasons, including: (1) the Convention replaces
“a plethora of conflicting claims by coastal States with universally agreed
limits…on the exclusive economic zone [EEZ]…” and (2) “the world community’s interest in freedom of navigation will be facilitated by the important
compromises on the status of the [EEZ]….”2
While that may have been the understanding of the assembled delegates
in 1982, the “Constitution for the Oceans” is on the verge of collapse, as a
handful of nations continue efforts to increase their control in the EEZ at the
expense of the navigational rights and freedoms enjoyed by all nations in the
zone. Efforts to expand coastal State jurisdiction to include residual competencies in the EEZ, like security jurisdiction, were soundly rejected by a majority of the nations that participated in the negotiations.3 At the conclusion
of the Conference, the negotiators achieved consensus on Articles 55, 56, 58
and 86, all of which accommodate the resource interests of the coastal State in
the EEZ without diminishing user State interests in freedom of navigation and
other internationally lawful uses of the sea in the zone.
Continued self-serving efforts by some States to reinterpret the Convention to unilaterally and unlawfully advance their national interests in the EEZ
impinge on traditional uses of the oceans by all States and are inconsistent
with international law, long-standing state practice and the intent and negotiating history of UNCLOS III. If these efforts succeed and the “package deal”
is abrogated, the Convention will unravel over time and the international
community will once again be plagued by a new wave of excessive maritime
claims that will threaten international peace and security.

II. THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
On 10 December 1982, nearly forty percent of the world’s oceans that
were once considered high seas open to all nations were encompassed within
a new zone created by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS)—the 200 nautical mile (nm) exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The
new zone, however, was not placed under the sovereignty of the coastal State.
Rather, coastal States were granted “sovereign rights” in the zone for the purpose of “exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing” living and nonat Montego Bay, accessed at 21 Maarch 2019, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf.

Ibid.
Satya N. Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne, eds., II United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A
Commentary, (Virginia: BRILL, 1993), 491-821. [hereinafter Virginia Commentary II]
2
3

478

Maintaining Freedom of Navigation and Overflight

living natural resources.4 The term “sovereign rights” was deliberately used
to clearly distinguish between coastal State resource rights and other limited
jurisdiction in the EEZ,5 and coastal State authority in the territorial sea where
nations exercise the more comprehensive right of “sovereignty.”6 Article 89,
which applies to the EEZ pursuant to Article 58(2),7 confirms this distinction,
providing that “no State may validly purport to subject any part of the high
seas to its sovereignty.”8
Throughout the negotiations, it became clear that creation of the EEZ was
a package deal—resource rights would belong to the coastal State and, “in so
far as such rights are not infringed, all other States enjoy the freedoms of navigation and communication” in the zone.9 In other words, user States would
relinquish their resource rights in the EEZ in favor of the coastal States, but
would retain high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight and other lawful
uses of the seas in the zone.10
Notably, Article 86 reflects this package deal by acknowledging that the
EEZ is a new regime, while at the same time retaining the distinction that had
previously existed between the high seas and the territorial sea.11 The first
sentence of the article recognizes that the EEZ is sui generis, and that certain
resource-related high seas freedoms (e.g., resource exploitation and marine
scientific research) do not apply in the EEZ. However, the second sentence
makes clear that nothing in Article 86 abridges the high seas “freedoms enjoyed by all States in the EEZ in accordance with Article 58.”12
Thus, within the EEZ, all States enjoy high seas freedoms of “navigation
and overflight…, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the seas related to those freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines,
United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS], art. 56.
5
Coastal States also have jurisdiction over resource-related off-shore installations and structures, marine
scientific research, and protection and preservation of the marine environment. Ibid.
6
Ibid., art. 2; Virginia Commentary II, note 3 above, at 431-444.
7
Article 58(2) provides that “Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the…
[EEZ] in so far as they are not incompatible…” with Part V. UNCLOS, art. 58(2).
8
Ibid., art. 89.
9
Satya N. Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne, eds., III United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982:
A Commentary, (Virginia: BRILL, 1995), 63-64. [hereinafter Virginia Commentary III]
10
At the opening of the fifth session, Ambassador Koh indicated “that the special character of…[the EEZ]
calls for a clear distinction to be drawn between the rights of the coastal State and the rights of the international community in the zone. A satisfactory solution must ensure that the sovereign rights and jurisdiction
accorded to the coastal State [in the EEZ] are compatible with well-established and long recognized rights
of communication and navigation. Ibid., at 65.
11
Ibid., at 69.
12
Ibid., at 60-71.
4
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and [which are] compatible with the other provisions of the Convention.”13
These activities, with the exception of laying pipelines,14 may be undertaken
without coastal State notice or consent and include a broad range of military
activities such as: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations; military marine data collection and naval oceanographic surveys; war
games and military exercises; bunkering and underway replenishment; testing
and use of weapons; aircraft carrier flight operations and submarine operations; acoustic and sonar operations; naval control and protection of shipping;
establishment and maintenance of military-related artificial installations; ballistic missile defense operations and ballistic missile test support; maritime interdiction operations (e.g., visit, board, search and seizure); conventional and
ballistic missile testing; belligerent rights in naval warfare (e.g., right of visit
and search); strategic arms control verification; maritime security operations
(e.g., counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation); and sea control.
All States may also conduct non-resource-related maritime law enforcement activities in foreign EEZs without coastal State notice or consent pursuant to Article 58(2), which provides that “Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the EEZ in so far as they are not
incompatible…” with Part V.15 These constabulary operations include actions
taken to counter the slave trade (Article 99) and repress piracy (Articles 100–
107), suppression of unauthorized broadcasting (Article 109) and narcotics
trafficking (Articles 108), the exercise of the peacetime right of approach and
visit (Article 110), the duty to render assistance (Article 98), and the right of
hot pursuit (Article 111).16

III. UN SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT IN THE EEZ
As a general rule, unless otherwise provided for in the Convention or other
binding international instrument, ships are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the flag State in the EEZ and on the high seas.17 However, if a ship sails
under the flags of two or more States, using them according to convenience,
the ship may not claim any of the nationalities and may be assimilated to a
ship without nationality, subject to the jurisdiction of all States.18 The UN
Security Council can also authorize non-consensual boarding of foreign flag
13

UNCLOS, art. 58(1).

Article 79(3) provides that “the delineation of the course for the laying of…pipelines on the continental
shelf is subject to the consent of the coastal State.” UNCLOS, art. 79(3).
15
Ibid., art. 58(2).
16
See also UNCLOS, art. 86.
17
UNCLOS, art. 92(1).
18
Ibid., art. 92(2).
14
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vessels in the EEZ and on the high seas by carefully worded Security Council
resolutions.19
North Korea (DPRK) has been under UN sanctions since 2006 when it
conducted its first nuclear test on 9 October.20 These sanctions, designed to
disrupt the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, have
been incrementally imposed over the past eleven years and include trade embargoes, arms embargo, shipping restrictions, a ban on sale of luxury goods,
financial sanctions and diplomatic sanctions.21
Despite these robust sanctions, North Korea continues to evade sanctions,
principally through illicit ship-to-ship (STS) transfers of refined petroleum and
coal. Evasion of sanctions by the DPRK is facilitated by deceptive shipping
practices that obfuscate the identity of the vessels, the goods being shipped,
and the origin or destination of the cargo. Deceptive tactics include physically
altering the vessel’s identification (name and IMO number); falsifying cargo
and vessel documents; and disabling or manipulating Automatic Identification
Systems (AIS) to mask movement or conceal the vessel’s next port of call.22
For example, in 2018, at least 263 tankers delivered refined petroleum
products to DPRK ports which were procured from prohibited STS transfers.
Assuming these tankers were fully laden (3.78 million barrels), North Korea
would have imported more than seven and a half times the amount of refined
petroleum allowable under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2397.23
Sanctions enforcement at sea is based on flag State consent beyond the
territorial sea. UNSCR 2375 calls on “Member States to inspect vessels with
the consent of the flag State, on the high seas, if they have information that
provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contains
items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by…” appliFor example, following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, the Security Council passed a resolution
calling on “…Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime
forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary
under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related
to such shipping laid down in Resolution 661 (1990).” S/RES/665 (1990), Aug. 25, 1990.
20
United Nations Security Council, Establishment of a Security Council Sanctions Committee (1718 Committee), S/RES/1718 (14 October 2006).
21
Ibid.; see also S/RES/1874 (2009), June 12, 2009); S/RES/2087 (2013), Jan. 22, 2013); S/RES/2094
(2013), Mar. 7, 2013; S/RES/2270 (2016), Mar. 2, 2016; S/RES/2321 (2016), Nov. 30, 2016; S/RES/2356
(2017), June 2, 2017; S/RES/2371 (2017), Aug. 5, 2017; S/RES/2375 (2017), Sept. 11, 2017; and S/
RES/2397 (2017), Dec. 22, 2017.
22
Dept. of State, Dept. of the Treasury, and U.S. Coast Guard North Korea Sanctions Advisory, Updated
Guidance on Addressing North Korea’s Illicit Shipping Practices, Mar. 21, 2019, accessed 21 March 2019
[hereinafter DPRK Sanctions Advisory], https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/
Documents/dprk_vessel_advisory_03212019.pdf.
23
Ibid.
19
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cable Security Council resolutions.24 Some States have argued that enforcement actions in the EEZ, including the right of approach and visit, may only
be taken by, or with the consent of, the coastal State, since the UNSCR specifically refers to the “high seas.” Given that most illicit STS activities occur
in transfer areas located in the Chinese, Russian and North Korean EEZs, and
that these nations are not currently conducting robust sanctions enforcement
operations in these wasters, such an absurd interpretation of UNSCR 2375
would effectively negate the UN sanctions regime in the East China Sea, the
Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan.
As a result, a coalition of eight nations—Australia, Canada, France, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States—
have expanded their surveillance of North Korea’s smuggling activities in
these waters, despite frivolous objections, by deploying warships and aircraft
to better detect and disrupt STS transfers and other sanctions violations. These
coalition efforts ensure that DPRK-related UNSCRs are fully and effectively
implemented until North Korea denuclearizes.25

IV. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE EEZ
The United States has consistently maintained that nothing in Part V of the
Convention restricts the right of all States to conduct lawful military activities
in the EEZ. At the conclusion of UNCLOS III, the United States emphasized
that all States would continue to enjoy in the EEZ:
“…traditional high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight and the
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms, which remain qualitatively
and quantitatively the same as those freedoms when exercised seaward of
the zone. Military operations, exercises and activities have always been
regarded as internationally lawful uses of the sea. The right to conduct
such activities will continue to be enjoyed by all States in the exclusive
economic zone. This is the import of Article 58 of the Convention.”26

United Nations Security Council, DPRK Sanctions, S/RES/2375 (11 September 2017).
DPRK Sanctions Advisory, note 22 above.
26
17 third UN Conference on the law of the sea, plenary meetings, official records, UN Doc. A/Conf.62/
WS/37 and ADD.1-2, 244 (1973-1982). Accord the signing and ratification statements of Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom. Declarations and Statements, United Nations, Oceans & Law of the Sea, UNDOALOS, accessed 21 March 2019, www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/ convention_declarations.htm.
24
25
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A handful of States do not agree with this position.
1) Of the 168 Parties to UNCLOS, thirty States purport to restrict or regulate military activities beyond the territorial sea;
2) Sixteen have enacted domestic regulations restricting military activities in the EEZ (Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Cape Verde, China, India,
Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, North Korea, Pakistan,
Portugal, Thailand and Uruguay);
3) Two have not enacted domestic regulations, but on occasion object to
military activities in the EEZ (Indonesia and the Philippines);
4) Seven claim a territorial sea in excess of 12 nm, which has the same
effect as restricting military activities in the EEZ (Benin, Congo, Ecuador, Liberia, Peru, Somalia, and Togo); and
5) Five claim security jurisdictions in their 24 nm contiguous zone.27
These illegal restrictions take many forms and include:
1) restrictions on weapons exercises;
2) limitations on military marine data collection and hydrographic surveys;
3) restrictions on nuclear-powered ships;
4) prohibitions on intelligence collection;
5) restrictions on navigation and overflight through the EEZ;
6) prohibitions on conducting flight operations;
7) prior notice or consent requirements;
8) application of domestic environmental laws and regulations; and
9) requirements that State aircraft file flight plans prior to transiting the
EEZ.
None of these excessive claims have a basis in customary international
law, UNCLOS, state practice or the Chicago Convention.
When discussing limitations on military activities, it is important to recognize that UNCLOS does impose some restraints on military ships and aircraft
at sea. However, none of these restrictions apply in the EEZ. Article 19 prohibits certain military activities in foreign territorial seas for ships engaged in
innocent passage, such as threat or use of force, use of weapons, intelligence
gathering, acts of propaganda, launching and landing of aircraft and other
military devices, military marine data collection, and intentional interference
with coastal State communication systems.28 Article 52 applies the same limiDepartment of Defense, Maritime Claims Reference Manual (MCRM), Department of Defense Instruction 2005.1–M, June 2008, accessed 21 March 2019, http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/code_10_
mcrm.htm.
28
UNCLOS, art. 19(2).
27
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tations to archipelagic waters.29 Submarines and other underwater vehicles
engaged in innocent passage in foreign territorial seas and archipelagic waters
must navigate on the surface and show their flag.30 Articles 39 and 54 prohibit
the threat or use of force when ships are engaged in transit passage or archipelagic sea lanes passage (ASLP),31 and Articles 40 and 54 prohibit survey activities for ships engaged in transit passage or ASLP.32 Similar restrictions are
not found in Part V of the Convention and therefore do not apply to warships,
military aircraft and other sovereign immune ships and aircraft operating in
or over the EEZ.

A. COASTAL STATE RESTRICTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
AIRSPACE
Efforts by some States to regulate military activities, such as ISR operations, in international airspace beyond the 12-nm territorial sea have no basis
in international law. UNCLOS is very clear—coastal States lack competence
to regulate military activities in the airspace above the EEZ. Coastal State
authority is limited to the national airspace above the territorial sea and archipelagic waters, where the coastal State exercises sovereignty.33 The airspace
above the EEZ is considered international airspace and, like the high seas, is
not subject to coastal State sovereignty.
Activities in international airspace are governed by the Convention on
International Civil Aviation of 1944 (Chicago Convention).34 Article 1 of the
Convention grants coastal States “complete and exclusive sovereignty over
the airspace above its territory,” which includes “the land areas and territorial
waters adjacent thereto.”35 Thus, a State may restrict or prohibit foreign aircraft, military or civilian, from flying over certain areas of its territory for reasons of military necessity or public safety.36 Moreover, state aircraft--aircraft
used in military, customs and police services—are prohibited from flying over
the territory of another State or land thereon without the authorization of that
State.37
Nonetheless, these authorities only apply to national, not international,
airspace. More importantly, with the exception of the prohibition on overflight
Ibid, art. 52.
Ibid, art. 20 and 52.
31
Ibid., art. 39 and 54.
32
Ibid., art. 40 and 54.
33
Ibid., art. 2 and 49.
34
Convention on International Civil Aviation, (opened for signature 7 December 1944), 15 U.N.T.S. 295
[hereinafter Chicago Convention].
35
Ibid., art. 1 and 2.
36
Ibid., art. 9.
37
Ibid., art. 3.
29
30
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of national airspace, State aircraft are exempt from the rules of the Chicago
Convention, including observance of Flight Information Regions (FIRs).38
The only requirement is that State aircraft operate with “due regard for the
safety of navigation of civil aircraft.”39
Thus, neither UNCLOS nor the Chicago Convention grants coastal States
any authority over military aircraft operating in international airspace beyond the 12 nm limit. On the contrary, UNCLOS Article 56 specifically limits
coastal State sovereign rights in the EEZ to the seabed, its subsoil and the
waters superjacent to the seabed, with one exception—coastal State exclusive
rights over the production of energy from the winds. Similarly, Article 3 of
the Chicago Convention only limits military activities in national airspace
and exempts State aircraft from compliance with the Convention’s provisions
applicable in international airspace. Of note, Brazil’s efforts to designate the
airspace above the EEZ as national airspace was soundly rejected by the International Civil Aviation Organization Legal Committee, stating that Brazil’s
proposal flagrantly contradicted “the relevant provisions of UNCLOS which
equate the EEZ…with the high seas as regards freedom of overflight.”40

B. COASTAL STATE RESTRICTIONS ON MARINE DATA
COLLECTION IN THE EEZ
In addition to sovereign rights over resources in the EEZ, coastal States
are granted exclusive jurisdiction over marine scientific research (MSR) in the
zone.41 Although consent should normally be granted, the coastal State may
withhold its consent in certain specified circumstances delineated in Article
246(5)(a)-(d), and it may suspend or terminate a previously approved MSR
project as set out in Article 253.42
Some coastal States, however, purport to regulate all marine data collection in the EEZ, arguing that such operations are akin to MSR and are
therefore subject to coastal State control.43 To the extent that coastal State laws
Article 3a. provides that the Convention “shall be applicable only to civil aircraft and shall not be applicable to state aircraft.” Ibid.
39
Ibid., art. 3d.
40
Barbara Kwiatkowska, The 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone in the New Law of the Sea (New York:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1989), 203.
41
UNCLOS, art. 56(1)(b)(ii) and 246(1)-(2).
42
Ibid., art. 246 and 253.
43
China, for example, prohibits all types of marine data collection without Chinese consent. Law of the
People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, Order No. 6, art.
8 (promulgated by the 3rd Meeting of the Standing Committee ninth National People’s Congress., Feb.
26, 1998, effective June 26, 1998), http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONAND TREATIES/
PDFFILES/chn_1998_eez_act.pdf; Provisions on the Administration of Foreign-Related Maritime
Scientific Research, June 18, 1996 (promulgated by Decree No.199 of the State Council of the
People’s Republic of China, June 18, 1996); Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Survey38
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purport to regulate hydrographic surveys and military marine data collection
(i.e., military oceanographic surveys and underwater, surface and aviation ISR
missions), they are inconsistent with UNCLOS, State practice and customary
international law.
The terms “research” and “survey” are not defined in UNCLOS. However, various articles of the Convention clearly distinguishes between MSR,
hydrographic surveys, and military activities. Ships in innocent passage may
not engage in “research or survey activities.”44 Similarly, “marine scientific
research and hydrographic survey ships may not carry out any research or
survey activities” while engaged in transit passage, unless authorized by the
States bordering the strait.45 The same restrictions apply to ships transiting
archipelagic waters in innocent passage and ships engaged in ASLP.46 And one
of the high seas freedoms enumerated in Article 87 is “freedom of scientific
research.”47
More importantly, Article 56 and Part XIII only grant coastal States jurisdiction over MSR.48 Thus, while coastal States may regulate MSR and surveys
in the territorial sea, archipelagic waters, international straits, and archipelagic
sea lanes, they may not regulate hydrographic surveys and military marine
data collection in the other maritime zones, including the contiguous zone and
the EEZ. Hydrographic surveys and military marine data collection activities
remain issues governed by high seas freedom of navigation and other internationally lawful uses of the sea, and are therefore exempt from coastal State
jurisdiction in the EEZ.49
The distinction in UNCLOS between MSR and other forms of marine data
collection reflects centuries of State practice. Since 1830, when the Department of Charts and Instruments was first established (today’s Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command), U.S. naval ocean surveillance and oceanographic survey ships have collected marine data and intelligence information
seaward of foreign territorial seas to build oceanographic and meteorological
profiles, maintain force protection, and inform naval commanders across the
full spectrum of naval operations. Only in the last twenty years have these operations come under scrutiny by a handful of rogue coastal States. UNCLOS
is clear, however—coastal State authority to regulate MSR does not apply to
ing and Mapping (promulgated by the 29th Meeting of the Standing Committee ninth National
People’s Congress, Aug. 29, 2002, effective Dec. 1, 2002).
44
UNCLOS, art. 19(2)(j).
45
Ibid., art. 40.
46
Ibid., art. 52 and 54.
47
Ibid., art. 87(1)(f).
48
Ibid., art. 56(1)(b)(ii) and 246(1)-(2).
49
Ibid., art. 58, 86 and 87.
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other separate and distinct activities, such as oceanographic surveys and military marine data collection efforts, including ISR operations.

C. INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS IN THE EEZ
Having failed at UNCLOS III to include security jurisdiction as a coastal
State competency in the EEZ, a few States cite Articles 59, 88 and 301 to
support their regulation of foreign military activities in their EEZ.50 In effect,
these States argue that security jurisdiction was retained as a residual right
under Article 59 and that military activities violate the peaceful purposes provisions of the Convention (Articles 88 and 301).51 These arguments are not
supported by a plain reading of UNCLOS, State practice, the Chicago Convention, or any other applicable international instrument.
UNCLOS addresses intelligence collection in only one article—Article
19(2)(c). That provision restricts foreign ships transiting the territorial sea in
innocent passage from engaging in “any act aimed at collecting information
to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal state.”52 An analogous
limitation does not appear in Part V of the Convention regarding the EEZ.
Similarly, Article 3 of the Chicago Convention limits coastal State authority
over military aircraft to national airspace. Coastal States may not regulate
State aircraft activities seaward of the territorial sea in international airspace.53
For example, on June 29, 2011, China warned the United States to stop conducting Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations (SRO) near the Chinese coast because they violate PRC sovereignty and security.
Kenneth Allen & Jana Allen, “Assessing China’s Response to U.S. Reconnaissance Flights,” China Brief
11 no. 16 (2011). Similarly, on August 29, 2014, China warned the United States to stop its SRO flights near
Chinese territory, claiming that the surveillance activities undermine China’s security interests and could
lead to “undesirable incidents.” Sophie Brown, Stop Spy Flights, China Warns the U.S., CNN, (Aug. 29,
2014), accessed 21 March 2019, http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/29/world /asia/china-us-spy-flights/.
50

Article 59 provides: “In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or
jurisdiction to the coastal State or to other States within the exclusive economic zone,
and a conflict arises between the interests of the coastal State and any other State or
States, the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all the
relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the interests
involved to the parties as well as to the international community as a whole.” Article
88, which applies to the EEZ via Article 58, provides: “The high seas shall be reserved
for peaceful purposes.” Article 301 provides: “In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention, States Parties shall refrain from any threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in
the Charter of the United Nations.” UNCLOS, art. 59, 88 and 301.
51

52
53

Ibid., art. 19(20)(c).
Chicago Convention, art. 3.
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The text of UNCLOS and the Chicago Convention reflect State practice
since 1945. During the Cold War, warships and military aircraft from the
NATO alliance and the Soviet bloc routinely collected intelligence and conducted military marine data collection operations in what is today the EEZ.
Such surveillance activities were lawful and acceptable to NATO so long as
Soviet ships and aircraft remained outside of the territorial sea and complied
with the obligations of the 1972 International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea (COLREGS)54 and the 1972 US–USSR Agreement on the
Prevention of Incidents on the High Seas (INCSEA).55 Even on those rare occasions when coastal States objected to foreign ISR flights off their coast, normally they claimed that the aircraft intruded into “national” airspace, rather
than questioning the legality of intelligence collection generally.56 This longstanding State practice continues today, as military surveillance aircraft and
survey ships from a number of countries, including Australia, China, Japan,
NATO, Russia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom (to name a few), operate on, under and over the world’s oceans collecting marine data for military
use.
Of note, the issue of aerial reconnaissance was brought before the UN
Security Council following a series of incidents involving the United States
and the Soviet Union. During the deliberations, the Soviet delegation specifically rejected the position that a coastal State had the right to interfere with
intelligence collection activities beyond national airspace.57 The United Kingdom delegations similarly indicated without objection that aerial surveillance
directed at a coastal State from international airspace was consistent with international law and the UN Charter.58

Convention on International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, (opened for signature 20 October 1972), 28 UST 3459, TIAS 8587, 1050 U.N.T.S. 17.
55
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, Dec. 29, 1972,
852 U.N.T.S. 151, as amended by the Proto-col thereto, May 22, 1973, 24 UST 1063, TIAS No. 7624, and
by the 1998 exchange of diplomatic notes.
56
For example, in June 2012 Syrian forces shot down an unarmed Turkish RF-4E Phantom reconnaissance
aircraft. Damascus justified its actions claiming that the Turkish spy plane was operating within Syrian
national airspace when it was engaged. The Syrians did not allege that ISR operations, in general, were per
se illegal. Eric Schmitt & Sebnem Arsu, “Backed By NATO, Turkey Steps Up Warning to Syria”, NEW
YORK TIMES (June 27, 2012), accessed 21 March 2019, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/world/
middleeast/turkey-seeks-nato-backing-in-syria-dispute.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. See also Oliver J. Lissitzyn, “Electronic Reconnaissance from the High Seas and International Law” in The Role of International
Law and an Evolving Oceans Law, Richard B. Lillich & John Norton Moore, eds. (Rhode Island: Naval War
College, 1980), 566–567, 574–575, 578–579.
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Lissitzyn, ibid.
58
Ibid.
54

488

Maintaining Freedom of Navigation and Overflight

With regard to peaceful purposes, Article 301 of the Convention calls on
States to “refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any State….”59 The language is identical to text
in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter on the prohibition of armed aggression in the
relations among States.60
UNCLOS Article 19 makes a clear distinction between “threat or use of
force” on the one hand, and other military-related activities, on the other. Article 19(2)(a) repeats the language of Article 301, prohibiting ships in innocent
passage from engaging in “any threat or use of force against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State.”61 The remaining subparagraphs of Article 19(2) restrict other military activities in the
territorial sea.62 The distinction in Article 19 between “threat or use of force”
and other types of military activities clearly demonstrates that UNCLOS does
not automatically equate use of force with these other military acts.
The “peaceful purposes” language has its origin in the text of UN General
Assembly Resolution 2749 (1970), which declared that the sea-bed beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction was reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes.63 A proposal by a group of developing nations to include a version of
Article 301 in Article 88 was not adopted.64 Similarly, an effort to include the
new Article 301 in Part V of the Convention was also defeated “by maritime
States on the ground that security matters should not be considered within the
EEZ regime.”65
59

UNCLOS, art. 301.

UN Charter Article 2(4) provides that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations.” Charter of the United Nations, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, Oct. 24, 1945.
60

61

UNCLOS, art. 19(2)(a).

Other military activities prohibited by Article 19 include: (b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; (c) any act aimed at collecting information to the
prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal State; (d) any act of propaganda
aimed at affecting the defense or security of the coastal State; (e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft; (f) the launching, landing or taking on board of
any military device; (j) the carrying out of research or survey activities; and (k) any
act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities or
installations of the coastal State. UNCLOS, art. 19.
63
United Nations General Assembly, Res. 2749 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/Res/2749 (Dec.
17, 1970).
62

Virginia Commentary III, note 9 above, at 90.
David J. Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law” (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1987), 69.
64
65
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Nonetheless, some developing States took the position that Articles 88 and
301 would prohibit all military activities in the oceans. Ecuador, for example, argued that “the use of the ocean space for exclusively peaceful purposes
must mean complete demilitarization and the exclusion from it of all military
activities.”66 This strict interpretation of the “peaceful purposes” language was
opposed by the maritime States, arguing instead that the test of whether an activity was considered “peaceful” was determined by the UN Charter and other
obligations of international law.67
The United States, for example, stated that:
“The term “peaceful purposes” did not, of course, preclude military activities generally. The United States has consistently held that the conduct
of military activities for peaceful purposes was in full accord with the
Charter of the United Nations and with the principles of international
law. Any specific limitation on military activities would require the negotiation of a detailed arms control agreement. The Conference was not
charged with such a purpose and was not prepared for such a negotiation.
Any attempt to turn the Conference’s attention to such a complex task
would quickly bring to an end current efforts to negotiate a law of the sea
convention.”68
Most commentators that have addressed this issue agree with the United
States:
“…that based on various provisions of the Convention…, it is logical…to
interpret the peaceful…purposes clauses as prohibiting only those activities which are not consistent with the UN Charter. It may be concluded accordingly that…Articles 88 and 301 do not prohibit all military activities
on the high seas and in EEZs, but only those that threaten or use force in
a manner inconsistent with the UN Charter.”69
Thus, the determination of whether an activity is “peaceful” is made under
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and the “peaceful purposes” provisions must
be read in conjunction with the general body of international law, including
the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense reflected in Article
51 of the UN Charter.70
Virginia Commentary III, note 9 above, at 88-89.
Ibid., at 89-91.
68
Ibid., at 89. See also V THIRD UN CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 67TH PLENARY
MEETING, OFFICIAL RECORDS, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WS/67, at 62 (1973–1982).
69
Moritaka Hayashi, “Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities in the EEZ: Definition of Key Terms,”
29 Marine Policy 29 (2005): 123–137.
70
In the commentary accompanying the U.S. President’s letter of transmittal of the Convention to the Sen66
67

490

Maintaining Freedom of Navigation and Overflight

To accept that all military activities are, by their nature, inconsistent with
the “peaceful purposes” provisions would be contrary to the decisions of the
UN Security Council, which indicate that “military activities consistent with
the principles of international law embodied in [Article 2(4) and Article 51
of] the Charter of the United Nations…are not prohibited by the Convention
on the Law of the Sea.”71 The International Court of Justice has similarly
ruled that naval maneuvers conducted by the U.S. Navy from 1982 to 1985
off the coast of Nicaragua during the U.S.-backed counter-revolution against
the Sandinista government did not constitute a threat or use of force against
Nicaragua.72
The Security Council has likewise determined that peacetime intelligence
collection is not considered a “threat or use of force against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal state… in violation
of the Charter of the United Nations.” Following the shoot down of an American U-2 spy plane near Sverdlovsk in1960, an effort by the Soviet Union to
have a Security Council resolution adopted that would have labelled the U-2
flights as “acts of aggression” under the Charter failed by a vote of 7 to 2 (with
2 abstentions), thereby confirming that peacetime intelligence collection is
consistent with the UN Charter.73 Two months later, the Soviets shot down an
America RB-47H spy plane while it was conducting an ISR mission over the
Barents Sea near the Kola Peninsula. Again, the Soviets introduced a draft
resolution that would have labelled the surveillance mission an “act of aggression” under the Charter. The draft resolution was rejected by a vote of 9 to 2.74

V. CONCLUSION
Without question, coastal State competency in the EEZ is strictly limited
to resource rights, jurisdiction over resource-related offshore installations and
ate in 1994, President Clinton stated that none of the peaceful purposes provisions of the Convention “create new rights or obligations, imposes restraints upon military operations, or impairs the inherent right of
self-defense. … More generally, military activities, which are consistent with the principles of international
law, are not prohibited by these, or any other, provisions of the Convention.” Letter of Transmittal from
President Bill Clinton, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, S. Treaty Doc. 103–39, 103rd
Cong., at III and 94 (1994). A similar position was taken by President Bush in his 2004 letter of transmittal
of the Convention to the Senate: “The United States understands that nothing in the Convention, including
any provisions referring to ‘peaceful uses’ or ‘peaceful purposes,’ impairs the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense or rights during armed conflict.” United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
S. Exec. Rpt. 108-10, 108th Cong., § 3, at 16–17.
71
Virginia Commentary III, note 9 above, at 88-89.
72
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 227 (June
27).
73
S.C., 15th yr., 860th mtg., para. 87.
74
S.C., 15th yr., 883rd mtg., para. 187
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structures and MSR, and protection of the marine environment. Coastal States
do not retain residual security jurisdiction in the EEZ, and may not regulate
lawful military activities in the EEZ that are consistent with the UN Charter,
UNCLOS, the Chicago Convention, and other relevant international law instruments.
Reflecting on this issue in 2008, Ambassador Tommy Koh recalled that
“some coastal states would like the status of the EEZ to approximate the legal
status of the territorial seas. Many other states held the view that the rights
of the coastal States in the EEZ are limited to the exploitation of living and
non-living resources and that the water column should be treated much like
the high seas.” He went on to state that “I find a tendency on the part of
some coastal States...to assert their sovereignty in the EEZ...[and doing so]
is not consistent with the intention of those of us who negotiated this text,
and is not consistent with the correct interpretation of this part [Part V] of the
Convention.”75
All nations, particularly those that make excessive claims in their EEZ,
should heed Ambassador Koh’s instructive analysis and abide by their treaty
obligations. The creation of the EEZ was a package deal—coastal States were
granted exclusive resource rights and user States retained the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight, and other lawful uses of the seas associated
with those freedoms, which have always applied beyond the territorial sea.

Tommy T.B. Koh, “Remarks on the Legal Status of the Exclusive Economic Zone”, in Freedom of Seas,
Passage Rights and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, Myron H. Nordquist, Tommy T.B. Koh & John
Norton Moore, eds. (Virginia: BRILL, 2009), 53.
75
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